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NAME-CALLING AND THE
CLEAR ERROR RULE
Robert F Nagel*
Given my generally skeptical orientation on judicial review, I am
inclined to agree with much of James B. Thayer's famous and influential
essay.1 Reflection, however, forces me to the conclusion that his think-
ing has had a paradoxical and pernicious effect on our jurisprudence and
on the broader political culture. Before developing my specific argument
about the consequences of Thayer's position, I want to indicate one of the
reasons for my gloom about the modem judiciary's role in constitutional
interpretation. Since in the past I have not been especially persuasive in
justifying other aspects of my pessimistic assessment, this effort today
probably will not convert anyone. It might be useful, nevertheless, to
depict some of what (in my view) has gone wrong. I shall then try to
show how Thayer's ideas have inadvertently contributed to this state of
affairs.
I
A few months ago, the District Court for the City and County of
Denver, Colorado was asked to issue a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of a state constitutional amendment that had just been en-
acted by a vote of the people. 2 You have probably heard of "Amend-
ment 2," which prohibits the state and its subdivisions from enacting or
enforcing any law
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of... [any] claim...
* Ira C. Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of Law. A
version of this Essay will appear in ROBERT F. NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHAR-
ACTER (forthcoming 1994).
I James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). For a perspective on the relationship between Thayer's writings and my
own positions, see Maurice J. Holland, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 196 (1991) (review-
ing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES (1989)). See also James R. Stoner, Jr., Consti-
tutional Culture Shock, 53 REv. POL. 396 (1991) (same).
2 Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993), aff'd, 854
P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993). Judge Jeffrey Bayless granted the motion.
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[of] minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination. 3
This provision, needless to say, had been vigorously debated among the
thousands of Colorado voters; indeed, it continues to be the focus of in-
tense political and economic pressures involving groups from across the
country.4 In our system, however, it fell to a solitary municipal judge to
decide the issue, at least as a preliminary matter, and it probably will fall
to a few other state and federal judges to resolve it on a more permanent
basis.
I call your attention to this case because it involves, obviously, in-
tense and profound differences of opinion about morality, human nature,
and political justice. Opponents invoke important values such as per-
sonal autonomy, equality, and procedural fairness. 5 Supporters of the
amendment, on the other hand, have concerns about the growing list of
groups receiving special protection under various civil rights laws; they
are anxious about the viability of the institution of marriage (which, after
all, has historically been premised on the assumption that society can
favor heterosexual relationships); and they are profoundly uncertain
about egalitarian experimentation on policies having consequences for
such a sensitive and mysterious matter as sexual identity.6 Many of you
probably sympathize with the values behind opposition to the amend-
ment, and I suspect that some, perhaps most, of you are feeling an im-
pulse to dispute the accuracy, sufficiency, or relevance of my reference to
considerations behind support for the amendment. You may be inclined
to believe that the amendment serves no legitimate public purpose at all.
If so, you can find your views spelled out (perhaps more strongly
than you might wish) in the Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of a Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.7 That brief begins with a statement of the case,
which includes a description not only of the defendants and the plaintiffs
but also of "the proponents" of Amendment 2.8 This section notes that
the amendment was drafted and promoted by a nonprofit group called
Colorado for Family Values (CFV). It asserts that CFV was assisted by
the National Legal Foundation, which is described as "an organization
founded by the Reverend Pat Robertson." After summarizing various
statements made by CFV in support of its position on the amendment,
3 COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 30b (voter-approved change).
4 See, e.g., Jeffrey Leib, Springs Hotel Cuts 60 Jobs, DENV. POST, Mar. 6, 1993, at Cl (discuss-
ing boycott against Colorado and estimating a loss of $33.8 million to Denver economy due to lost
convention business).
5 See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Evans v. Romer, No. 92
CV 7223, 1993 WL 19678 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1993), aff'd, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) [herein-
after Plaintiffs' Brief] (on file at the Northwestern University Law Review offices).
6 See, e.g., Fred Brown, Amend. 2 Boycott Spurs Backlash, DENV. POST, Jan. 3, 1993, at Al
(giving results of poll of Coloradans).
7 See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 5.
8 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 5, at 4-9.
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the brief asserts that CFV's campaign "is not the first effort in this coun-
try to legislate discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals." As
the plaintiffs phrase it, "The first campaign by the religious ight... was
led by Anita Bryant in Dade County, Florida, in the 1970's." The brief
then helpfully (but without revealing its source) defines the "religious
right" as being characterized by "a belief that the Bible should be inter-
preted literally, opposition to a set of values labelled 'secular humanism,'
and an evangelical commitment to convert and to limit the influence of
Satan, liberalism, socialism, and communism."
Painting now with a broad brush, the brief asserts that in the early
1980s the "'New Right' political movement incorporated the religious
right" and that "[t]he approach developed by the 'New Right' . . .to
promote anti-homosexuality measures ... is akin to Hitler's appeals to
traditional German family values." This section of the brief ends by list-
ing a series of organizations-"Paul Weyrich's Free Congress Founda-
tion, Beverly LeHaye's Concerned Women of America, Jerry Falwell's
Moral Majority, Robert G. Grant's Christian Voice, Phyllis Schlafly's
Eagle Forum, Paul Cameron's Family Research Institute, Pat Robert-
son's Christian Coalition"-and by asserting that these organizations
provided support for "what appeared to be local, grassroots efforts to
defeat 'homosexual privilege proposals.'" It is unclear whether the
plaintiffs mean that all or any of these organizations were behind local
support for the Colorado amendment. Plaintiffs do note darkly that "[a]t
least two national religious right organizations are based in Colorado
Springs" where, as the brief had noted earlier, CFV is also located. To
close the point, the plaintiffs assert that "several" employees of James
Dobson's Focus on the Family "sit on Colorado for Family Values advi-
sory boards."
To what is this sinister description of "the proponents" relevant?
While the specific logical connections are largely left to the reader's im-
agination, the brief is quite clear about the general significance of the
information. 9 It is used to support the argument that the purposes of
those who voted for Amendment 2 were illegitimate.10 Those purposes
are described as a "desire to harm a politically unpopular group" and as
an expression of "prejudice" and "fear" and "antipathy." The amend-
ment's true and sole purpose was "to encourage and support discrimina-
9 See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 5, at 4 n.8 ("A detailed description of the proponents of
Amendment 2 is presented because of the plaintiffs' discussion of improper governmental purpose set
out.., below."). Judge Bayless granted the preliminary injunction in part on the ground that there
is a reasonable probability that by having the State "endorse and give effect to private biases,"
Amendment 2 would be found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Evans v. Romer, 1993 WL
19678, at * 11. Governments are, of course, constantly in the business of enforcing private decisions,
preferences, and moral judgments; at this stage of the litigation, Judge Bayless has not yet fully
explained why he thinks "bias" might be the appropriate word in this case.
10 See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 5, at 39-42.
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tion." The proponents' "purportedly neutral rationale" was used to
"mask their campaign of hatred."
Now, the issue of gay rights evokes powerful ideological and moral
loyalties, but we can put such reactions aside long enough to acknowl-
edge that the brief I have described is conspiratorial and ugly in its own
way. Its circles of moral condemnation shift and merge until they en-
velop the voters of an entire state. When such absolutist rhetoric and
such loose generalizations are used by, say, the John Birch Society, we
recognize them for what they are.
Our electoral campaigns give full expression to deep fears, flimsy
theories, and harsh accusations. (The debate that preceded enactment of
Amendment 2 evidenced much of it on both sides of the issue.) In our
political life, some of this is unavoidable and even useful. But how did it
come to pass that in our ordinary courts of law it is thought appropriate
and useful to characterize the official decisions of our fellow citizens in
crude and extreme ways?
It is possible, of course, to answer this question by asserting that
realism and accuracy sometimes require the public's motivations to be
described in completely negative terms. Those who see Colorado voters
as prejudiced and hate-filled will be inclined to this view. 1 But such an
answer only moves my question: How did it come to pass that the edu-
cated people who give this answer (including careful lawyers) can so con-
fidently and severely condemn the thinking and the motivations of
hundreds of thousands of people? To me at least, this question is espe-
cially troubling in the circumstances of Amendment 2, where the deci-
sion being judged involved sensitive and elusive issues, which, while
profoundly important to us all, are not fully understood by any of us.
II
I have been describing an argument made in a single brief in a single
case. Even if you accept my characterization of that argument, you must
be saying, probably with some impatience, "But that case and that brief
are not necessarily typical; moreover, even if they were indicative of some
disturbing trend, you cannot lay this kind of excess at the feet of poor
James B. Thayer."
Actually, the shrill and simplistic depiction of public purposes has
become a common feature of our constitutional jurisprudence. It is such
a frequent part of the work of even Supreme Court Justices (let alone
everyday lawyers advocating their causes) that we are hardly conscious
of it. At least, we are not usually surprised or offended by the harshness
of the judgments that are so routinely passed. Accordingly, it is worth
reviewing some of the well-known constitutional cases that have ended in
11 A Denver Post/News 4 poll of Colorado voters (for what it is worth) indicated that the beliefs
of the voters were complex and, on the whole, tolerant of homosexuals. See Brown, supra note 6.
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insulting descriptions of the objectives of public decisions-not to count
them up or analyze them-but to try to see their language without our
usual sense of close familiarity.
The place to start is race. I realize that in both political debate and
academic commentary, charges of "racism" are now endemic. Neverthe-
less, to me it is striking how free judges have felt to make the charge
against other public officials and even, on occasion, against whole elec-
torates. They have done so appropriately with respect to laws that are
plainly intended to separate and stigmatize. But they have also made the
accusation in more complicated and subtle circumstances. For example,
school board decisions that fail to achieve prescribed levels of racial bal-
ance are termed "intentionally segregative acts," even when the goal of
balance was in competition with other legitimate public objectives, such
as neighborhood schooling or funding for educational quality.12
Although less frequently, courts have also made similar charges where
the official action was facially neutral, nondiscriminatory in its immedi-
ate effect, and unrelated to any injunctive regime. Thus, a state constitu-
tional affirmation of the absolute right of any person to sell private
property was found to involve the state in private racial discrimination
and to "encourage" such discrimination. 13 In any of these situations, the
local authorities or voters may well have been wrong for one reason or
another. But it surely is untrue to the complexity of what many of these
people were trying to do to portray their purposes as "segregative" or
"discriminatory."
Given the central place that racism undoubtedly holds in our his-
tory, it may be that suspicions about official motivations and purposes in
this area are specially justifiable or, at least, defensible. But the Justices
have made analogous charges in a number of nonracial cases. They de-
scribed the public's objective in providing (but not requiring) separate
nursing education for women as perpetuating nursing "as an exclusively
woman's job." 14 They declared an apparently trivial and-at worst-
morally ambiguous law, which allowed females to purchase beer at an
earlier age than males, to be "invidious."1 5 The Court concluded that a
city ordinance singling out group homes for the mentally retarded re-
flected an "irrational prejudice." 16 An eligibility requirement for food
12 Eg., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 n.10 (1973).
13 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967); see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a local initiative that allowed school boards to require
busing for nonracial reasons while forbidding them to require busing for racial integration); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding unconstitutional an amendment to local charter that re-
quired ordinances regulating property transactions on the basis of race to be approved by majority of
voters).
14 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
15 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
16 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
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stamps that excluded households containing unrelated members was said
to be based on "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopu-
lar group."' 17 The Justices insisted that a prohibition on the distribution
of contraceptives that distinguished between married and unmarried per-
sons was wholly irrational. 18
To describe public objectives as based on prejudice and irrationality
and as aimed only at doing harm to specific groups-this seems to me an
astonishingly condemning stance that on a wide range of issues our
judges seem neither reluctant nor surprised to take. But the cases I have
alluded to do not at all complete the bleak picture that the Supreme
Court draws of the rest of us. In a variety of settings, Justices have de-
scribed public officials as being intent on nothing less than the subversion
of the Constitution itself. A law that authorized public school students
to have a moment of silent meditation "or voluntary prayer" was, it
turns out, intended to endorse prayer and even to return official prayers
to the schools. 19 (This conclusion was largely based on what one legisla-
tive supporter had said.20) Similarly a law requiring "balanced treat-
ment" of evolution and creation science in public schools was "clearly"
intended to advance the creationists' religious viewpoint.21 (The Court
treated one legislator's statement that evolution was "contrary to his
family's religious beliefs" as evidence for this conclusion. 22 In an earlier
case, the Justices had based a similar conclusion about the influence of
"fundamentalist sectarian conviction," in part, on the content of newspa-
per advertisements and letters to the editor.23) When Congress enacted
the Flag Protection Act of 1989,24 it was not giving voice to legitimate
concerns about the importance of the flag as a symbol of national unity.
It was, according to the Justices, only providing further proof of the
"popular" inclination to stifle dissenting viewpoints. 25 When a state re-
quired that women who are seeking abortions be provided with certain
truthful but troubling information, that state was not merely misguided
on a morally complex issue; it was seeking to "intimidate women," to
create the "opposite" of informed consent, and to defy the lawful author-
17 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
18 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (hold-
ing dividend distribution plan that discriminated on basis of state citizenship irrational); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (describing distinction in state law between men's and women's oppor-
tunities to be appointed as administrator of an estate as "arbitrary").
19 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
20 Id. at 56-60.
21 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987).
22 Id. at 592 n.14.
23 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 n.16 (1968).
24 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 11 1990).
25 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990). Analogously, the Court sometimes
ignores evidence of, for example, valid public health objectives and depicts the public's purpose as
protectionism or "economic discrimination." E.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951).
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ity of the Court in much the same way that southern rioters tried to
block school integration.26
It is possible that every law struck down by the Supreme Court us-
ing words like "irrational," "prejudiced," "invidious," "suppressive,"
and "defiant" were, on the whole, bad laws. I also concede that some of
the motivations that went into their enactment may have been-probably
were-regrettable or even reprehensible. I still insist that we have be-
come inured to the extreme rhetoric the Justices use in characterizing the
decisions of others. I also insist that, however ignorant or evil these
other decisionmakers may be, this rhetoric (as well as the "findings" and
legal analysis that it expresses) is inaccurate in that it does not leave
enough room for the difficulty of the judgments involved, the ambiguity
of human motivations, and the complex nature of public decisionmaking.
I have alluded to a substantial number of Supreme Court decisions,
involving a range of legal subjects, that condemn public enactments as
being expressions of prejudice or irrationality or invidiousness. Every
such decision invites untold numbers of briefs of the sort filed to attack
Amendment 2 in Colorado. And every such brief urges another of the
thousands of state and lower federal courts to label some product of our
political institutions as wholly unjustifiable (or worse). In short, to a re-
markable extent, our courts have become places where the name-calling
and exaggeration that mark the lower depths of our political debate are
simply given a more acceptable, authoritative form. We legal academics
have been so busy applauding the judiciary's theoretical capacity for ele-
vated dialogue and sensitive moral decisionmaking that we have not
much noticed the tenor of much of what the judges have actually had to
say. Their condemnations are seldom directed at us or those with whom
we identify anyway. And we are safe in assuming that the fears and
animosities and guesses and hopes that animate our own political agen-
das are unlikely-since we educate the judges-to be crushed under the
weight of words like "prejudice."
There are many reasons why the discourse of our public law has
sunk so low. To begin with, the vocabulary of the law necessarily reflects
the larger culture, and our society (say some critics) lacks the capacity
for moral debate. If this is too bleak, there are also more specific factors
at work. The adversary system, which honors argument more than dis-
cernment, tends to promote caricature; the adjudicatory system, dealing
as it does with winners and losers, leaves little room for ambiguity; legal
education is easier and more fun if it promotes forms of analysis that are
both simple and self-serving; and so on. Within the broad parameters of
the legal culture, one particular contributing factor seems to me to be
this: The dominant version of judicial restraint, a doctrine that might
have been expected to limit the range of cultural disputes to be resolved
26 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 759, 764-771 (1986).
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by the courts and (in any event) to modulate the terms of legal discourse,
has been Thayer's "clear error rule."
III
The central proposition in Thayer's argument is that courts can de-
clare a legislative act unconstitutional only when the law was "not
merely ... a mistake, but... a very clear one-so clear that it is not open
to rational question."' 27 One of the major purposes of this rule, according
to Thayer, was to promote a proper degree of respect for legislative judg-
ments. He emphasized how constitutional questions can "seem unconsti-
tutional to one man, or body of men, [and] may reasonably not seem so
to another."' 28 He described the judicial decision as secondary, both in
sequence and in importance. He said that constitutional questions prop-
erly involve issues of practicality in which legislatures can be expected to
have expertise; moreover, he repeatedly warned against traditional legal-
istic methods as "pedantic," "narrow," and "literal." And he wanted it
to be "studiously remembered" that the courts should always assume
"virtue, sense, and competent knowledge" in the legislature. 29
Nevertheless, the clear error rule does anticipate that sometimes
courts will hold a legislature's constitutional judgment to be irrational.
Thus Thayer's formulation seems to require courts to engage in at least
some of the harsh terminology that I have said is now a significant part
of our constitutional discourse. His rule, however, contemplates that the
charge of irrationality will be rare and will be made in a way that is
consistent with appropriate judicial humility. And, indeed, it is logically
possible for a Thayerian court to disregard statutes infrequently and even
then to express high regard for the enactors' motivations and knowledge.
For instance, legislators might decide to ignore a very specific and pro-
foundly immoral constitutional provision-such as a requirement, which
was once a part of our fundamental charter, that each state deliver up
escaped slaves. The resulting statute might be unconstitutional in a way
"not open to rational question," and yet the legislators' action could be
described as valiant, moral, and enlightened. Even the decision to violate
a legal obligation to uphold the Constitution might be praiseworthy from
many perspectives. Judges presumably would be faced with such statutes
on few occasions and would invalidate them reluctantly-only because
no rational view of the Constitution permitted judicial enforcement.
Such a judge could express admiration for the ideas underlying the stat-
ute while "disregarding" it as a legal matter.
Although Thayer intended for the clear error rule to be applied in a
way that is respectful of legislatures and although even when it leads to
27 Thayer, supra note 1, at 144.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 149.
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the invalidation of a statute the rule is logically compatible with such
application, the seeds of the opposite result lie throughout his essay. In-
deed, as a realistic matter, Thayer's formulation is a recipe for creating a
self-deluding and imperious judiciary.
The self-image of judges employing the clear error rule will be pro-
foundly complacent. They must feel and announce great reluctance
before invalidating a statute. Even when, on a "just and true construc-
tion," a law seems unconstitutional, they are to exercise restraint.30 Nat-
urally, these judges will be motivated to believe that they are highly
selective in voiding legislation and that, when they do, their judgments
are specially justified. Moreover, because Thayerian judges have had to
reach "the really momentous question" raised by the clear error rule,
they have entered the realm of statesmanship. 31 Their role goes far be-
yond that of mere lawyer. In constitutional cases they act as a kind of
safety net, protecting the fundamental law against the worst violations,
intervening only where (even given the widest range for "the great, com-
plex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government") there is but a single ra-
tional conclusion.32 Their judgments necessarily involve some of the
most vital and imponderable political issues, yet their conclusions are
finally a matter of inescapable legal duty. Respectful and restrained, in-
tellectually capacious and yet rigorous, called to act only in the most
extreme circumstance, these judges are-in brief--quiet heroes.
The view from the heroic perspective is a fine one, but what is to
prevent heroic judges from running amok? The range of their decisions
is not restricted to those few cases where a literal reading of the text or
some other "pedantic" analysis can authoritatively decide the issue.
Moreover, the sense of complacency and elevation encouraged by the
clear error rule might reduce actual self-restraint even as it induces the
conviction that discipline has been exercised. In particular, the heroic
judge can be expected to brook no opposition or dissent after a determi-
nation of unconstitutionality. The disputed governmental policy, after
all, was illegal in a way "not open to rational question." Political disa-
greement in this circumstance will tend to be perceived as illegitimate
defiance, not as potentially useful information. In short, Thayer's meth-
odology relies on judicial self-restraint in a way that greatly reduces the
potential for external checks. Yet it is precisely the ambitions of leaders
who see themselves as heroic that stand in greatest need of limits im-
posed from the outside.
Thayer's answer, of course, is that judges are permitted to override
the decisions of others only when those decisions are clear errors. That
is, Thayer believed that legislatures would not often make irrational con-
stitutional judgments and that courts-if properly instructed about the
30 Id. at 144.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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need to presume good sense in legislators-would confine their power to
those extraordinary occasions. This presupposes the happy circumstance
that judges and political representatives have common criteria for "ra-
tional" constitutional decisions even when these decisions involve the
evaluation of a wide assortment of practical considerations. Without this
assumption, there is no reason why conscientious legislators (working
from their criteria) might not frequently come to conclusions that (from
the radically different perspective of a judge) appear clearly irrational. If
this should occur, Thayer's judges would tend to intervene often, to be
unaware of the scope of the power they are exercising, and to be impervi-
ous to criticism.
IV
To what extent do judges and political decisionmakers hold the
same criteria for rational constitutional judgment? It is possible that a
society exists where lawyers and general citizens fully share a general
intellectual culture and a specific decisionmaking methodology. This
could happen where lawyers exercise great power and thus shape the
terms of public dialogue. 33 On the other hand, it would also seem likely
where lawyers are subject to the influence of the wider culture-where,
for example, legal training is not highly differentiated from other educa-
tion, where the adjudicatory function is not isolated or specialized, and
where lawyers do not constitute an identifiable economic and social class.
In our society, the intellectual methods employed by lawyers are no
doubt used by virtually all other groups at least to a limited extent. And
these methods overlap significantly with the problem-solving instincts of
many in the educated, professional classes. However, American society
is varied enough and lawyering is specialized enough that the judgmental
standards common to the law are at least somewhat foreign to almost all
nonlawyers, and they probably are downright alien to some groups. 34
The happy circumstance presupposed by Thayer's formulation-that
political representatives and judges will agree on standards for rational
constitutional judgment--certainly cannot be assumed to exist. If the
specific issue is one that evokes differential standards even from groups
normally sympathetic to legal methods or if political influence has been
exerted by groups for whom legalistic criteria are alien, the clear error
rule will not serve as a constraint.
As an illustration of competing standards of rationality in operation,
consider the issue of flag burning. Akhil Amar has called Texas v. John-
son 35 "plainly right, and even easy-indeed as right and easy a case in
33 For my acknowledgement that judicial discourse has influenced the vocabulary of political
debate, see Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Ques-
tions Doctrine, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 643, 667-68 (1989).
34 See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES (1989).
35 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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modem constitutional law as any I know."'3 6 This sprightly description
is probably accurate if it means that the Court's decision was consistent
with cases and principles that are much admired within the legal profes-
sion (and especially by law professors such as Amar). As everyone
knows, Johnson construed "speech" functionally to protect communica-
tive conduct useful in political debate; it applied a strong principle
against "content discrimination" for the often-asserted reason that public
disapproval is a potentially boundless basis for permitting the suppres-
sion of an idea; and it acknowledged (as modem judges almost always
do) that a sufficiently important public objective would nevertheless jus-
tify the statute.3 7 The Court found that the State's purpose was insuffi-
cient because it could have been achieved in another way that would not
have suppressed speech.38 In fact, the Court asserted that its own rul-
ing-as a symbol of our common commitment to tolerance-would satis-
factorily sustain our sense of nationhood. 39 This form of analysis and
these conclusions probably sum up the attitudes that have pervaded free
speech law for decades. Amar is right, I think, that it is all self-evident to
many lawyers, so clear as to be beyond reasonable disagreement.40
As it happened, of course, neither the Court's conclusion nor its
reasoning seemed ineluctable to large segments of the American public.
After Texas v. Johnson, the Congress quickly enacted the Flag Protection
Act of 1989,41 which the Court also invalidated, 42 giving the same self-
evident reasons. As I have already indicated, the Justices dismissed the
"groundswell" that prompted Congress and the President to act as fur-
ther evidence of the populace's inclination to suppress ideas with which it
disagrees.43
It is true that the urge to suppress had something to do with the
political interpretation of the Constitution that the Court disregarded in
United States v. Eichman.44 But, if lawyers' intellectual standards can be
set aside for a moment, it is the Court that appears irrational. Obviously,
a functional definition of "speech" has potential ramifications that could
obliterate the distinction between speech and conduct. While lawyers
and judges may think that they can be trusted to avoid absurd extensions
36 Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 124, 125 (1992). Similarly, Mark Tushnet describes Texas v. Johnson as "simple and
straightforward." Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Cultures, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 199, 209 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTrTUTIONAL CULTURES (1989)); see also infra note 45.
37 491 U.S. at 404-6, 410, 412.
38 Id. at 410, 418.
39 Id. at 419-20.
40 Not to all lawyers, however. See Paul Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CAL. L. REV.
817 (forthcoming 1993) (presenting an extended critique of Amar's position).
41 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. H 1990).
42 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
43 See supra text accompanying note 25.
44 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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of functionalism, the outcome in Johnson itself could be thought by the
general public to undermine this assurance. After all, despite the fact
that burning the flag is expressive, in our history this behavior has not
been commonly viewed as protected "speech" any more than urinating
on the flag has been.45 Justices capable of taking leave of such long-
established understandings might sensibly be thought capable of eventu-
ally dissolving the basic distinction upon which the Free Speech Clause
depends.
Similarly, the "principle" against content discrimination is a plain
sign of irrationality to someone operating on the basis of practical knowl-
edge rather than conceptualism. To claim that the government can or
should treat all ideas as equally valuable is almost literally crazy for the
simple reason that some ideas are worthless or harmful. Of course, legal
theorists know this but tend to believe that there is an extreme danger in
permitting official judgments about content. Again, why should an expe-
rientially minded public regard this danger as real? Flag desecration
laws had long existed in many states, and they had shown no sign of the
kind of cancerous growth feared by the Court.46
Finally, the notion that judicially announced principles of tolerance
can serve the same unifying purposes as the flag is suggestive of the sort
of self-importance that in private lives precedes civil commitment. It as-
sumes that nationhood is built entirely on the basis of ideas-indeed, spe-
cifically on certain civil libertarian ideas that have had great influence on
the courts over the last seven decades-to the exclusion of emotional and
symbolic bases. This assumption is at odds with the observed behavior of
societies throughout history.
In sum, the flag burning controversy presents us with strong evi-
dence that on at least some constitutional issues the legal profession and
the general public possess profoundly different judgmental criteria. Law-
yers, it seems, tend to honor abstract theory, conceptualism, and intellec-
tualism generally; much of the public relies more on historical sense,
practicality, and visceral experience. Is this intellectual divide long
45 The Court itself had, at one time, refrained from reaching the conclusion that burning the flag
is "speech." See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969); cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376 (1968) (assuming only for purposes of argument that burning a draft card is speech). Nev-
ertheless, Mark Tushnet can say:
[I]t seems to me clear that the general public understands that punishing people for burning
flags is as pristine a violation of the core meaning of the first amendment as we are likely to see.
Tushnet, supra note 36, at 209. Tushnet does not explain how he knows this, but the full passage
strongly suggests that he is simply assuming that because his own opinions about the case are strong,
they must be shared by "the general public." However, given that Tushnet is an unconventional
thinker (a socialist, no less), his opinions are not likely to be an especially accurate index of the views
of the average person.
46 The Texas statute in Johnson, for example, applied only to public monuments, places of wor-
ship or burial, and to the state and national flags. 491 U.S. at 400 n.1 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989)).
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enough and wide enough to turn Thayerian judges into the kind of self-
deluding juggernaut that I have suggested is theoretically possible? The
record of the federal judiciary over the past four decades is instructive.
In many respects, that record displays exactly what would be predicted if
the clear error rule were to be applied in circumstances of significant
cultural division.
There have been, as we all know, innumerable judicial decisions in-
validating political determinations. These decisions have touched virtu-
ally every topic of public concern, but they are concentrated and most
spectacular in two kinds of areas. The first involves issues, such as free-
dom of speech and criminal procedure, where lawyers' thinking is highly
specialized and, therefore, counter-intuitive to a broad range of the pub-
lic. The second involves issues like abortion, school desegregation, and
religion where public policies have been influenced by social classes that
are educationally and socially distinct from the class occupied by law-
yers. Neither of these sets of judicial decisions can be explained as mani-
festations of straightforward partisan differences. They have continued
despite considerable changes in the political complexion of the bench.
They appear, that is, to represent cultural disagreements.
This extraordinary array of decisions has not been accompanied by
proportionate signs of self-awareness on the part of the judges exercising
power. Many audacious opinions actually acknowledge the courts' re-
sponsibility to defer to majoritarian preferences and painfully examine
the record for any sign of good sense. Indeed, even while ordering the
redesign of a state's entire prison system or the reorganization of a city's
program of public education, jurists profess great reluctance and
humility. They seem genuinely regretful that the political deci-
sionmakers did not face up to their responsibility to decide the issues in
the way that the judges believe would have been correct. It is only this
obduracy, the decisions say, that forces judicial intervention.47
Ostensibly respectful attitudes, however, tend to dissolve when polit-
ical decisionmakers either defy or are thought likely to defy a judicial
ruling. In such circumstances, the courts have freely expanded the scope
of constitutional protections-by way of prophylactic rules, elaborate
doctrines, and so on-in order to forestall not only outright defiance but
47 To take one egregious example, the court-ordered desegregation plan for the Kansas City
school system had a price tag of over $460 million and involved the creation of a performing arts
middle school, a 25-acre wildlife area, and capital renovations "without parallel in any other school
district in the country." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 60-61 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part). When the citizenry declined to pay for this plan, the trial judge ordered a tax increase, ex-
plaining that he could see "no alternative." Id. at 51. For its part, the Supreme Court also adopted
the language of moderation by invoking the need to respect the "integrity and function of local
government institutions." Id. It concluded, therefore, that the lower court should have ordered the
local authorities to raise taxes rather than raising them by itself. Id. This method, said the Court,
would be entirely in keeping with the judicial function. Id. at 55.
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also more shaded forms of disagreement.48 On certain memorable occa-
sions, the Supreme Court has used the specter of defiance to assert aston-
ishingly grandiose claims for its own authority.4 9 Lower courts in
similar settings can be more direct; not uncommonly, they react by tak-
ing over more administrative or legislative functions and sometimes even
by abridging the constitutional rights of those who express
disagreement.50
All this is precisely what would be expected of judges possessing the
self-image of reluctant hero that is a natural outgrowth of Thayerism.
But, of course, the mentality of the clear error rule is only one of many
possible causes of the characteristics of modem judicial power. Naive
textualism, simplistic historicism, rampant pragmatism, arrogant ration-
alism, clanky doctrinalism-any of these can and do explain aspects of
the phenomenon. Even if it is theoretically possible that Thayerism
helped to build the contemporary judicial machine, why believe that it in
fact did so or that it was a significant factor?
V
It is only a slight overstatement to say that in modem times there
has been just one intellectually respectable version of judicial restraint.
Neither rigorous textualism nor serious historicism has been practiced by
the Supreme Court, and piles of academic commentary have posed very
significant questions about whether either approach is possible or would
(in any event) result in a restrained judiciary. The banishment of these
forms of legal traditionalism has been personalized in the Senate's rejec-
tion of Robert Bork's nomination to the Court and in the flood of harsh
criticism spawned by his subsequent book.5' By way of contrast, the rep-
utation of the common-law methodology of Justice John Marshall
Harlan has solid foundations in the work of eminent scholars like Alex-
ander Bickel,5 2 and it continues to grow. Recently, Harlan has been the
subject of considerable and respectful academic interest.5 3 His jurispru-
dence is held up as a model of responsible restraint even in popular jour-
nals.54 Conservative Justices, including Sandra Day O'Connor, David
48 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 208-09
(1988); Robert F. Nagel, Disagreement and Interpretation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS (forth-
coming 1993).
49 See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
50 See Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural Injunction, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395,
405-06 (1984).
51 As was to be expected, the classic illustration is Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 657 (1990).
52 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35-46 (1962); see also
infra note 75.
53 E.g., Symposium, Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
54 E.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Leader of the Opposition, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1993, at 20, 27.
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Souter, and Anthony Kennedy, find themselves being rehabilitated by
mainstream commentators who find Harlan-like tendencies in their
work.55
Harlan's opinions are highly regarded precisely because they display
all the elements of Thayer's approach. Justice Harlan understood consti-
tutional issues to involve, not the "narrow" or "literal" issues of text and
history, but the grand and practical issues of political life. To these is-
sues, however, he brought intellectual rigor rather than emotion or ab-
straction. He understood the need to defer to wisdom expressed in the
political process. He was restrained both in his formulation of the issues
and in his willingness to let the meaning of initial decisions be elaborated
on a case by case basis. And Harlan saw the judiciary's task of interpre-
tation as an aspect of its duty to adjudicate specific disputes.
Today Harlan is admired for all these attributes, but I think he is
also admired because in actual operation his Thayerian methods led him
to the role of quiet hero. In fact, his work set the stage for much of the
cultural imperialism that is the record of the Court in the second half of
this century.
Consider again Akhil Amar's characterization of the flag burning
case, Texas v. Johnson.56 He correctly described that decision as embod-
ying free speech principles that have been very widely accepted and fre-
quently applied. Johnson broke new ground only as a specific application
of well-established ideas. The case most directly responsible for estab-
lishing these ideas is Cohen v. California,57 a much admired opinion writ-
ten by Justice Harlan. In upholding the right to wear a now famous
"scurrilous epithet" sewn to a jacket, Cohen used virtually the same logic
as the Court later employed in Johnson. In style, however, Harlan's
opinion displays all the appealing attributes of a rigorous common-law
decision. It defines the legal issue with great precision; it carefully and
deferentially examines all the arguments for permitting suppression; its
conclusion is painstakingly restricted to circumstances where the govern-
ment has not shown "a more particularized and compelling reason for its
actions. 58 But behind all this thoughtfulness and caution can be heard
the voice of the hero.
Harlan dismisses the notion that the display of the words "fuck the
draft" was inherently likely to cause a violent reaction as "plainly unten-
55 Id.; cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A
Case Study in Categorization and Balancing, 55 ALB. L. REv. 605, 617 (1992) (discussing the use of
balancing analysis by conservative Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992)
(same).
56 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
57 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
58 Id. at 26.
88:193 (1993)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
able" and reflecting an "'undifferentiated fear or apprehension.' ,,59 As
for the claim that suppression served the purpose of maintaining a "suita-
ble level of discourse within the body politic," Harlan invokes "examina-
tion and reflection." 6 He is confident that the sensibilities of passersby
could be adequately protected if they would just (why didn't the local
officials think of it!) avert their eyes. On the other hand, what is at stake
in protecting this "trifling and annoying instance of... distasteful abuse
of a privilege" 61 is, if only enough thought is applied, momentous. Pro-
tecting individual freedom here will serve to "produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity."'62 In fact, "no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests."' 63 Plainly, the officials of California had made
an enormous error; the moral underpinnings of our political system were
at risk; only the measured reflections of a few Justices lay between us and
eventual calamity. This was a small decision, reluctantly and carefully
arrived at, but it would serve the highest, not to say the most grandiose,
purposes.
Some citizens who are not blessed with a legal education may plausi-
bly wonder about the rationality of the Court's continuing claim that
"the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests" requires ordinary people to walk around with their eyes
averted against what in some places has become a virtual onslaught of
crude, offensive messages. Be that as it may, a second line of modern
cases is, if anything, an even clearer example of the Court's cultural im-
perialism. These are the decisions that establish and elaborate the right
to privacy, especially as this right applies to sexual conduct and to abor-
tion.64 This line descends, of course, directly from Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,65 which in turn grew directly from Justice Harlan's famous
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman.66
The Ullman dissent is, in most respects, vintage Thayerism. Harlan
begins by arguing that the Court should not avoid deciding the constitu-
tional question raised by a state's rule against the use of contraceptives.
Like Thayer, Harlan emphasizes that the power of judicial review arises
from the Court's "duty to decide ... the particular controversies which
come to it.''67 On the merits of the issue, Harlan departs somewhat from
59 Id. at 23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)).
60 Id. at 23-24.
61 Id. at 25.
62 Id. at 24.
63 Id.
64 For a discussion of the cultural aspects of opinions on the right to abortion, see KRISTIN
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
65 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 525.
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Thayer by attempting to justify the imposition of a nondeferential stan-
dard for evaluating the State's purpose. Despite this, much of his analy-
sis remains consistent with the clear error rule. He asserts that the Court
should view the Constitution as a "basic charter of our society" rather
than literally and that the Due Process Clause has become a general bul-
wark "against arbitrary legislation. ' 68 The constraints on judges in this
endeavor are their own "judgment and restraint. '69 He acknowledges
the controversial nature of the moral judgments that are involved in reg-
ulating human sexuality and notes that this alone requires the judge "to
hesitate long before concluding that the Constitution precluded Connect-
icut from choosing as it has among these views."' 70 Having expressed his
reluctance and humility, Harlan is freed to explain his conclusion, which
is that the application of the criminal prohibitions in the statute to mar-
ried couples "is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the
conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's life." 71 The
State, says Harlan, has not "even remotely suggest[ed] a justification for
the obnoxiously intrusive means it has chosen." 72 The law "involves
what, by common understanding throughout the English-speaking
world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the
privacy of the home in its most basic sense."'73 What is at stake, in short,
is " 'the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.' 74
Again, while Harlan describes the constitutional interest in terms of
the most timeless aspects of civilization and the governmental action as
both aberrational and utterly unjustifiable, he is still careful to limit the
reach of the decision that he is urging on the Court. For example, he
says his reasoning would not apply to intrusions required to enforce laws
against adultery and fornication. The good Thayerian judge remains se-
cure in the knowledge that his intervention has been exceptional and
small. But, given the terms of Harlan's own opinion, these assurances
ring hollow. Those terms make Harlan the protector of society's most
basic and valuable principles against forces that are mindless and pro-
foundly dangerous. Harlan establishes a role that is sure to be irresistible
to the later judges who would actually determine the ultimate implica-
tions of the "modest" decision at hand.
In addition to continuing activism in the areas of free speech and
privacy, the record of the Court in recent decades has been marked by
extraordinary claims about the judiciary's institutional role. These
claims have been the Court's response to political opposition. They are
68 Id. at 541.
69 Id. at 542.
70 Id. at 547.
71 id. at 539.
72 Id. at 554.
73 Id. at 548.
74 Id. at 550 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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manifest in the largely unfettered prerogative of lower courts to assume
administrative and legislative powers when faced with local resistance.
They are also manifest in the Court's self-important descriptions of its
own function. Most recently, for example, several of the Justices opined
that at least on the most socially destructive and morally profound is-
sues, such as abortion, it is the Supreme Court's job to call "the contend-
ing sides of a national controversy to end their national division."'7 5
Indeed, they went on to say that for the Court to give in to continuing
disagreement on such an issue would threaten
the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule
of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable
from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to...
speak before all others for their constitutional ideals.76
This language, which was authored by three Justices who no doubt view
themselves as careful judicial moderates, is (or ought to be) embarrass-
ing. But it is not really surprising; the groundwork had been laid for
some time. In part, it was laid by that earlier embodiment of judicial
modesty, Justice John Marshall Harlan. Harlan, as you know, signed
Cooper v. Aaron, which asked the American public "to recall some basic
constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine. ' 77 These included
a reiteration of the familiar assertion that the federal judiciary is
''supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," a claim that
the Justices described as "respected by ... the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system [ever since Mar-
bury v. Madison]. '78 This proposition presumably not being open to ra-
tional question, the Court went on to say that the Court's decisions
themselves are the "supreme law of the land" and that, accordingly,
every state officer is obligated to support these decisions.79 All this, said
the Court, is "indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaran-
teed ... for all of us."'80
A vast distance seems to separate the modest Thayerian assumption
that the power of judicial review arises from a legal duty to decide cases
and the exasperated pronouncement in Cooper v. Aaron that all officials
must obey the "supreme expositor." It might be thought, therefore, that
75 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992) (opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Souter, and Kennedy). This exalted self-image is based, I suspect, partly on the unfortunate influ-
ence of some hyper-excited academic commentary. This, too, is traceable to Thayer, who influenced
(for example) Bickel, who once wrote that the independent federal judiciary is "a bulwark, or at any
rate a symbol, that might just preserve and protect the very regime itself at some awful moment of
supreme peril." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
180-81 (1970).
76 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816.
77 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
78 Id. at 18.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 20.
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this specific idea should not be attributed to Harlan. He was only one of
the Justices who signed the opinion, and the circumstances of the case
were extraordinary. The lineage of the expansive claims of Cooper, how-
ever, does go back to Harlan himself. It was this proponent of judicial
restraint who insisted that the following sentence be included in Brown
1I: "[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them."' 81 It is clear enough, I think, why Harlan would favor this,
the strongest language in Brown II, and why he would later sign Cooper
v. Aaron. The rigorous and restrained analysis in his opinions was in
significant instances only a prelude to the extravagant characterization of
the societal interests to be served by the Justices' decisions. Dissent that
threatens such decisions threatens those lofty interests; it threatens the
authority of judges who already believe they have done the minimum
necessary to protect us from policies that, without any possible justifica-
tion, threaten the social fabric. Under this view, disagreement is
intolerable.
CONCLUSION
I do not want to be misunderstood as having argued that Thayerism
necessarily leads the courts to the kind of cultural imperialism that has
characterized the judicial record for the past several decades or that
Harlan laid the groundwork for all aspects of that record. The clear er-
ror rule can restrain judges, and Harlan was often restrained.82 What I
have tried to say is that, given enough cultural separation between jurists
and political leadership, Thayer's ideas in operation can be expected to-
and did-produce a great deal of disrespectful, intolerant, and expansive
judicial decisionmaking. That is, his prescription, applied in our circum-
stances, led to what it was intended to avoid. Given the extent of cul-
tural division in our society, those who want the courts to introduce civil
discourse into our political relations will have to look beyond the clear
error rule.
81 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). Gerald Gunther, who was clerking for
Harlan at the time, "vividly" remembers "that the Justice pressing most insistently for added muscle
in the decree was not one of the well-known liberals on the Court, but rather Harlan. More specifi-
cally, it was Harlan's voice and pen that was solely responsible for the toughest single sentence in
Brown 1." Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A Comment on Fried and Ackerman,
36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rnv. 67, 68 (1991) (emphasis in original).
82 For differing positions of how restrained Harlan was, see the articles in the symposium cited
supra note 53.
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